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THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING TRESPASS

CLAIM IS PRECLUDED

BY

THE

RULE OF CAPTURE
Mark E. Vandermeulen

YDRAULIC fracturing (a.k.a. "fracing") is a frequently-used
technique in the oil and gas industry worldwide for the harvesting of natural gas trapped inside impermeable rock formations
several thousand feet below the surface of the Earth and, therefore, unavailable through simple wellbore drilling techniques.1 Fracing is a process whereby water or a special fluid is mixed with proppants, like grains
of sand or ceramic beads, and then "pumped at high pressure and rate
into the reservoir interval (such as a rock formation containing natural
gas) to be treated, causing a fracture to open" along the natural fault lines
of the geometric formation. 2 These fractures, both vertical and horizontal, created by the high-pressure fluid injections are held open by the
proppants, because they would otherwise reseal under the immense pressure existing at that depth.3 The proppants allow the trapped natural gas
to flow freely to the wellbore where it can be pumped to the surface for
harvest. 4 The effect or length of the procedure is measured in three ways:
hydraulic length (distance the fluid travels), propped length (distance the
proppant travels), and effective length (area in which natural gas production is actually improved). 5 These lengths decrease in distance from the
well respectively, making the effective length the least expansive. 6 Fracing, however, is not an exact science. Though the vertical fractures are
confined "by barriers ... or other lithological changes above and below
the reservoirs," the horizontal fractures created can expand beyond the
estimated (and often intended) scope of the procedure. 7 This can become a problem when nearby parcels of land overlie the same rock formation and reservoir as the well performing the fracing procedure,
1. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W. 3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. 2008).
2. Environmental Protection Agency, Hydraulic Fracturing, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/vic/wellshydrofrac.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
3. Coastal, 268 S.W. 3d at 6-7.
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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potentially resulting in horizontal fractures that protrude into the neighboring parcel. 8 The issue of whether such intrusions constitute a trespass
was recently addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in Coastal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust.9 Although declining to rule on the broad
issue of whether such intrusions constitute a trespass in general, the court
held that the rule of capture precludes trespass claims that assert drainage
of the natural gas as the only injury. 10 Superficially, this limited holding
appears to be a legally unsound and overly pragmatic solution to a problem deserving of a more all-inclusive resolution, but deeper inspection
reveals an unarticulated forethought by the court, especially in its consideration of the impact on the industry at large.
Coastal Oil and Gas Corporation (Coastal) had been the lessee of minerals from a group of South Texas landowners' (Salinas) tract of land
(Share 13) for many years." Coastal also owned the mineral rights for a
parcel of property (Share 12), which borders Share 13.12 Both parcels
overlie the Vicksburg T formation, a natural gas reservoir between 11,688
and 12,610 feet below the surface of the Earth. 13 The Vicksburg T is a
"'tight' sandstone formation ... from which natural gas cannot be commercially produced without hydraulic fracturing stimulation.' 1 4 To harvest gas from the reservoir, Coastal placed a well (Coastal Fee No. 1) on
Share 12 roughly 660 feet away from the border of Share 13 and performed a fracing procedure in order to harvest the gas. 15 The hydraulic
length of the procedure was designed to extend over 1,000 feet from the
well, and both parties conceded that the hydraulic and proppant lengths
exceeded the property lease line. 16 Each party's expert witnesses, however, disagreed whether the effective length (the area in which the natu17
ral gas production is stimulated) had extended beyond the lease line.
Several months after filing suit, Salinas amended the pleadings to include
a trespass action for the fracing of Coastal Fee No. 1 into the reservoir
under Share 13, resulting in the substantial drainage of gas from Share
13.18
At trial, Salinas' expert asserted that twenty-five to thirty-five percent
of the gas produced by Coastal Fee No. 1 was being drained from Share
13 as a result of the fracing, claiming $388,000 to $544,000 in damages. 19
The jury found that there had been a trespass causing substantial drainage and awarded Salinas $1 million in damages for lost royalties. 20 The
8. See id.
9. Id. at 11-12.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.

14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 7.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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trial court, however, reduced those damages to $543,776, which was
nearly the maximum of Salinas' expert witness findings. 21 The Texas
Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi affirmed the jury's findings and reduced the damages. 2 2 Thereafter, Coastal filed a petition for review,
23
which was granted by the Texas Supreme Court.
Rather than resolve the issue as to whether trespass by fracing, or
"Tres-Frac," is an actionable claim, the Texas Supreme Court instead reversed the appellate and trial courts by holding that an "actionable trespass requires injury, and Salinas's only claim of injury ... is precluded by
the rule of capture. '24 In so holding, the court recognized the settled law
that the rule of capture gives title to a mineral rights owner for all the oil
and gas lawfully produced from a well bottomed on the owner's property,
"even if the oil and gas flowed to the well from beneath another owner's
tract."'25 Thus, despite whether the fracing had extended beyond Salinas's
property lines and into Share 13, causing natural gas to flow from Share
13 to Coastal Fee No. 1 on Share 12, there could be no injury based solely
26
on the resulting drainage and, therefore, no trespass.
At first, the majority tentatively recognized that trespass may not be a
reasonable claim because the common law maxim that ownership of land
reaches to the heavens above and to the center of the earth below "has
no place in the modern world."'27 Yet shortly after this proclamation, the
court expressly declined to determine the broader issue of whether hydraulic fracturing could constitute a trespass. 28 Rather, the majority focused on four specific reasons for keeping the rule of capture from
preventing trespass claims that assert drainage as the only injury. 29 First,
the court stated that full recourse for drainage is already available under
the law: the owner may himself drill a well on his property to offset the
drainage. 30 If the owner has already leased the mineral rights, he may
sue the lessee for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. 3 1 If drainage is not offset by these measures, the owner may offer to
pool with the draining party, and, if rejected, may apply to the Railroad
Commission (the governing body for drilling and oil production) to force
the draining party to pool. 32 Second, the court held that allowing for such
injuries would usurp the "authority of the Railroad Commission to regu21. Id.
22. Mission Res., Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust, 166 S.W. 3d 301, 331 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2005, pet. granted), overruled by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust, 268 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
23. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W. 3d at 5.
24. Id. at 12-13.
25. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 11 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946)).
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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late oil and gas production" secured by the rule of capture. 33 The court
justified this by determining that drainage could be equated to a taking in
the absence of the rule of capture, thus seriously impairing the Railroad
Commission's ability to regulate oil and gas production and making it
vulnerable to the takings clause of the constitution. 34 Third, the court
reasoned that the ability to accurately prove the value of drainage lost
would be too difficult, and courts are ill-equipped to undertake such analysis. 35 Fourth and finally, the Court looked to the abundant amicus briefs
received from the oil and gas industry and the community at large in reference to this case.3 6 Upon review of these submissions, the court recognized that not only did nearly every participant in the industry strongly
oppose liability for fracing, but also that in the over sixty years of fracing
by the oil and gas industry, "neither the Legislature nor the [Railroad]
Commission ha[d] ever seen fit to regulate it, though every other aspect
of production has been thoroughly regulated. ' 37 Notably, however, the
court expressly limited its holding by ruling that other misconduct, pre38
sumably relating to fracing, may not be shielded by the rule of capture.
Although concurring in the opinion, Justice Willett contended that hydraulic fracturing over property boundaries is no trespass at all, regardless of whether the injuries claimed drainage. 39 In support of this
argument, Justice Willett cited to Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Manziel, which held that water injected into reservoirs and crossing prop40
erty lines to push residual oil towards wells did not constitute trespass.
Specifically, Justice Willet found highly persuasive the opinion stated in
Manziel that "[t]he orthodox rules and principles applied by the courts as
regards surface invasions of land may not be appropriately applied to
subsurface invasions as [sic] arise out of the secondary recovery of natural
resources."'4 1 Moreover, after recognizing the "dire alarms sounded in
the amicus curiae briefs," Justice Willett asserted that allowing Tres-Frac
liability would significantly impede, if not cripple, the oil and gas industry
by discouraging the use of an effective and essential procedure at a time
when energy needs and costs are at an all-time high in Texas and around
the world. 42 More specifically, such liability would negatively impact the
production of natural gas from the Barnett Shale, which requires fracing
procedures for effective extraction. 43 Lastly, Justice Willett pointed to
alternative remedies available for trespass injuries not based on drainage
33. Id. at 14-15.
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 36 (Willett, J., concurring) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361
S.W.2d 560, 566-570 (Tex. 1962)).
41. Id. (Willett, J., concurring) (quoting R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d
560, 568 (Tex. 1962).
42. Id. at 31-33 (Willett, J.,concurring).
43. Id. at 31-32 (Willett, J., concurring).
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or precluded by the rule of capture, namely negligence. 44 His position is
firmly rooted in the principle that non-drainage damages arising out of
hydraulic fracturing should and would be adequately remedied under
negligence theories, therefore relieving
any need for trespass claims in
45
the area of hydraulic fracturing.
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the rule of capture should
not preclude drainage damages until it is determined whether fracing is a
trespass. 46 The key to the dissent's rationale was the premise that the
rule of capture is operable only when the oil or gas has been extracted
legally.47 Therefore, if fracing across property lines, regardless of the injury, does in fact constitute a trespass, then the rule of capture cannot be
applied due to the illegal nature of the procedure. 48 The dissent argued
that such fracing is a trespass and is thus illegal by likening it to a deviated well (one that is drilled at an angle into a neighboring owner's property) because both provide a means for gas to flow into the neighboring
well. 49 The dissent, therefore, claimed that the majority effectively
changed the rule of capture by applying it to practices of illegal extraction.50 The dissent warned that the majority's holding would reduce incentives for operators (drillers) to obtain mineral leases from small
property owners because they could instead simply drain gas from those
owners via fracing with impunity. 5 1
The dissent's recognition of the legality requirement to the rule of capture as stated in Halbouty v. Railroad Commission seems to render the
majority's four reasons for allowing the rule of capture to preclude a trespass claim in hydraulic fracturing moot and inapplicable.5 2 After all, if
the majority intentionally holds open the possibility for trespass claims
asserting injuries other than drainage, then there might be an implied assertion that hydraulic fracturing across property lines does constitute a
trespass. 53 If so, the court may have put the cart before the horse by
holding that the rule of capture negated the necessary injury element of
trespass, barring the claim, because the proper procedure would apparently be to determine whether the extraction was legal in the first place.
The question then becomes: which came first, the injury or the claim?
The majority argues that the nature of the injury should determine the
legality of the extraction, rather than the character of the extraction itself.
Yet only once the legality of the extraction is determined should the court
44. Id. at 30 (Willett, J., concurring).
45. Id. (Willett, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 43-44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 44-45 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 45 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 43 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Halbouty v. R.R. Comm'n, 357
S.W.2d 364, 375 (Tex. 1962) (harmonizing the rule of capture by holding that rule of capture grants ownership to all oil and gas legally recovered).
53. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W. 3d at 12.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

decide whether to apply the rule of capture, which is recognized as the
appropriate procedure. The majority thus wrongfully denied Salinas'
claims by precluding the drainage injuries based on the rule of capture
and, rather, should have determined whether or not hydraulic fracturing
across property lines constitutes a trespass.
In this case, however, the Texas Supreme Court is stuck between a rock
and a hard place: either determine that fracing is never a trespass and face
the potential destruction to individual property owners' mineral rights
across the state (not to mention subjecting them to unrecoverable property damage resulting from non-negligent fracing), or hold that it is always a trespass, regardless of the injury, and possibly cripple the thriving
and critical natural gas industry in Texas. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
court took the more pragmatic approach by simply limiting its holding to
drainage injuries, which of course has negative implications for individual
property owners. Coastal does, however, leave the door open for owners
injured by non-negligent fracing to potentially assert trespass claims not
involving drainage. At the same time, the natural gas industry is saved
from a windfall of lawsuits and debilitating jurisprudence for the time
being. Although the court improperly applied the rule of capture before
addressing the legality of the fracing procedure performed by Coastal,
there are drops of prudence and necessity within the decision, which allude to perhaps the most practicable solution given the surrounding circumstances of the industry at large.

